of Middle American trade and that the alleged British domination of the trade and maritime activity in that area, and specifically in Costa Rica, has been overemphasized 8 . In fact, Britain enjoyed a position of competitive leadership, confronted by various commercially aggressive nations at different times. Throughout the decades, but primarily in the last half of the 19th century, Germany and the United States demonstrated the most aggressive and successful competition, ultimately viewing each other as the chief rival for future leadership or domination of Middle American foreign economic ties.
Traditionally, Costa Rica's place in the unfolding drama of 19th century imperialism has been described as clearly subordinate in importance to Guatemala which is portrayed as the major Middle American participant in foreign trade. Costa Rica's diief product, coffee, is said to have been under the control of Britain through the financing of the export trade and because the coffee was shipped in British vessels to the British market. It is also often asserted that Britain used its influence in Costa Rica and Guatemala in the mid-19th century to counter a growing United States influence in Central America. Although a few voices have questioned this assumption, a challenge to British domination is usually only considered to have occurred about the time of World War I 4 .
Despite a tendency to consider Guatemala the chief fount of Central American exports and the main consumer of foreign products, the rather abundant data on importation and exportation of the Central American republics reveal that for the years under consideration Costa Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador were normally as active as Guate-') In this paper economic domination shall mean consistently the leading trading or maritime partner with at least a 50 "/o share of the economic activity under examination and no other nation in close competition for supremacy. The term leadership shall be used to designate a trade or maritime relationship in whidi one is usually the chief partner, but the share may often be less than 50 4 /o of the activity, and that occassionally another country may occupy the first position and normally at least one country is in close competition, 4 ) Vega Carballo, El nacimiento de un régimen de burguesía de Costa Rica, in: Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos, no. 5 (Mayo-Agosto, 1973) , pp. 171, 183; Fació, Economía costarricense, p. 53. The best balanced statement regarding Britain's role in Costa Rica in the mid-and late 19th century is, Ciro S a ntana, Formación de la hacienda cafetalera en Costa Rica, pp. 39-40. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Central America: A Nation Divided, New York/Oxford 1975, pp. 131-133 , for the assertion that Guatemala dominated Central American trade. mala, and apparently, only rarely did any one corner as much as 30 % of the total Central American trade. Among the Central American countries, Costa Rica usually ranked first or second in exportation until the 1880s when it fell to a consistent third place clearly behind Guatemala and El Salvador. Before 1880, any of these might in any given year have occupied any of the first three places. Costa Rica's importation pattern is similar to the export pattern except that in the 1880s, Costa Rica continued to be a strong contender for the leading position among the Central American countries in competition with Guatemala®.
Turning to look at the patterns of exportation and importation in Costa Rica (Table 1, Costa Rican Exportation and Table 2 , Costa Rican Importation by countries), we discover that English influence in trade and maritime activity was markedly less in Costa Rica than in Guatemala where Britain did control about 65% of the trade. The British share of Costa Rican exports for the years 1850 to 1870 ranged from 21 % to 51 %, with the average being about 35 % to 40%. This is hardly the kind of trade tie which could be called dominating, although it certainly indicated that Britain was consistently a major trading partner for Costa Rica. Among Costa Rica's other trading partners between 1850 and 1870, on the average France's share was about 23%, New Grenada's about 14%, Germany's about 6%, and the United States' about 9%. Even in the 1880s, Britain retained only a competitive leadership in regard to Costa Rican export trade. Britain averaged about 43 % yearly, but the United States averaged about 30% and France and Germany averaged about 11% each. A comparison of the relative activity of these four powers in relation to Costa Rican trade indicates that England's trade was stable throughout the mid-19th century, but France's trade was declining, while both the United States' and Germany's were generally increasing. Thus, while Britain dominated Guatemalan trade during mudi of the 19th century, the great powers competed for leadership in Costa Rican trade.
Perhaps only in the area of importation can we speak of British domination of 19th century Costa Rican trade (Table 2 ). Great Britain s ) Because of space limitations and because the table containing this data is not centrally relevant to this paper, the table is not reproduced here. It will appear in a later monograph encompassing the whole of trade and shipping patterns in Central America during the mid-and late 19th centuries.
accounted for from 36% to 69°/o of Costa Rican imports during the 1850s. For this decade Britain averaged about 50%, Germany about 10%, France about 6%, and the United States about 9% of Costa Rica's imports. "When data again become available in the 1880s, Britain has retained about 50% of Costa Rica's import trade, the United States has about 28%, France about 10%, and Germany about 8 %.
Shipping in Costa Rica (Table 3) was largely a story of British and United States activity, although at various times other nations played significant roles temporarily. British ships between 1843 and 1853 supplied about one-fourth of the vessels and something more than one-third of the tonnage. Throughout the 1850s, both figures declined until, for the period from 1859 until 1871, Britain supplied about 5% of both the number and tonnage of vessels stopping in Costa Rica. At some point a reversal of the trend began, although when is not clear, because shipping data for the years 1872 until 1878 are missing. From 1878 until 1885 Britain supplied about one-third of both number and tonnage of ships.
While the United States had supplied about one-fifth of the ships and tonnage between 1848 and 1856, in the late 1850s and early 1860s its share increased until, during the period between 1863 and 1873, it supplied about 70% of the ships and 90% of the tonnage. Beginning in 1874 and continuing until 1885, the United States' share of both number and tonnage settled back to about 50%. The inconsistency between stating that United States shipping was disturbed by the Civil War and these statistics is more apparent than real. Faced with increased competition from German and British lines, the Pacific Mail Steamship line, which primarily served mail and passengers rather than cargo, used larger vessels and made more frequent stops. Thus the number of United States vessels and the tonnage rose, but the only connection served was San Francisco-Costa Rica-Panama.
Germany's participation, including Hamburg and Bremen, remained quite steady at about 5% of the vessels and tonnage from 1848 until 1866, although the tonnage did begin to slip in the 1860s. By the 1870s, Germany accounted for only about 2% to 3% of the vessels and less than l*/o of the tonnage. In 1880, this downward trend reversed itself, as the number of vessels rose steadily toward about 8% and the tonnage rose above 2%. This gradual upward trend would continue throughout the remaining years of the 19th and early 20th century. The remaining European countries played modest roles, with occasional brief exceptions. For brief periods in the 1840s and 1850s, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador maintained significant maritime ties with Costa Rica, but these ties deteriorated after the Panama railroad's completion, and these countries ceased to play a role by the late 1860s. Only Colombia, undoubtedly due to its transit role in shipping Costa Rican exports, retained a minor maritime relationship with Costa Rica. Costa Rican vessels played only a modest and continually decreasing part in their country's maritime trade during the course of the years under examination.
The analysis of Costa Rican exportation by products (Table 4) is quite simple, but nonetheless informative. From the earliest date when data are available, 1843, until 1858, coffee represented between 71 % and 94 % of exportation by value. Then from 1859 until 1882 (except for 1876 and 1878), coffee made up 90% to 99% of the value of exports. Beginning in 1883, coffee began a slow tapering off toward 75 %. This downward trend continued throughout the rest of the 19th century and into the 20th century, as banana exports rose to a prominent position within Costa Rican foreign trade. First appearing in the export tables in ,1881 with 0.04%, banana exports readied almost 10% by 1885. Until the 1880s, it seems that no other single product played any noteworthy role in Costa Rica's export trade except tobacco in the 1840s and perhaps ores and bullion. With only sparse data available, it appears that during the 1840s tobacco may have averaged 10% of the value of exports. The precise role of mining output is unclear. The official figures suggest that it normally was below 1 %, but did climb in unusual years to as much as 16%. However, there is some indication that ores and bullion may have been a chief product in an ellicit trade between Costa Rica and Jamaica. The fact that the mines continued to operate over such a long period and to attract capital even in the capital -poor decades of the 1830s, lends credence to a smuggling theory 6 .
The data on the direction of Costa Rican coffee exportation (Table 5 ) supports the data on Costa Rican exports, which point to a British competitive leadership rather than domination of Costa Rican trade. Here Britain exercised a qualified domination of the purdiase of coffee, qualified by considerable competition from the United Sta-') ArayaPochet, La minerfa en Costa Rica, 1821 Rica, -1841 tes, Germany, and France. Britain's share of the coffee exports averaged about 40% to 45% in the 1850s and 1860s. However, beginning in 1870 and until 1885 its portion fell below 50% only in 1878 when it was about 43%. In 1885 the British share was barely over 50%. In the 1850s, France competed strongly, purchasing about 35% of Costa Rica's coffee on the average. Thereafter, France's share declined to below 10%, averaging about 7% or 8% from 1864 to 1878. By 1885 France had again climbed to a share of 12.7%. During the 1860s, Germany offered Britain the strongest competition, purchasing just under 20% of the coffee during that decade. Germany's share declined sharply in the 1870s to an average of about 4%, but rose again to 14% by 1885. Finally, beginning in 1870, the United States emerged as Britain's strongest competition for Costa Rican coffee, purchasing from 18°/» to 25% of the coffee and averaging around 20% yearly. The only other significant purchaser of Costa Rican coffee had been Panama during the 1850s when its purchases ranged from about 5 % to about 20 %.
The chief internal manifestation in Costa Rica of the Atlantic great power competition for exploitation of that country was the developing dependence upon coffee and later upon coffee and bananas as foreign-dominated export products. The rise of the banana plantations in the late 1870s and 1880s was accompanied by the first major direct foreign investments in Costa Rica's internal economy, with subsequent shaping and molding of the internal economy. The creation of the coffee culture had only required an indirect form of foreign interference in the domestic economy. The net effect of the rise of the coffee and banana export sectors in Costa Rica's relations with the dominant imperial powers was to encourage policies which diverted land, resources, labor, and capital to promote these export sectors. From this diversion of domestic economic resources to production for export arose the common phenomenon of the 19th and the 20th centuries, an agricultural society which was dependent upon the importation of basic agricultural foodstuffs 7 .
Costa Rica's diplomatic ties reflected its development as an export agricultural producer. Its early diplomatic contacts were with the concession for the long awaited Atlantic coast connection was granted to John C. Fremont and associates and later to Henry Meiggs. Officials in Costa Rica sought to negotiate communications and tariff agreements which would encourage the exchange of United States agricultural and manufacturing surpluses for coffee. Costa Rican President General Tomas Guardia pursued the idea of railroad construction, making it a reality in the 1870s and 1880s. Guardia also encouraged immigration and capital investment of all sorts in an effort to foster the maximum possible material progress of Costa Rica. Often he turned to United States citizens for technical and financial cooperation 10 . Although British power in Costa Rica (and throughout Central America) had been relatively small before the late 1840s, it had remained largely unchallenged until the main industrial and commercial powers of the world demonstrated acute interest in Central America beginning in the late 1840s. It is generally recognized that the United States interest in possible isthmian transit routes swelled during the years 1848-50. Germany also sought to protect its long-term interests in trade and transit during this crucial period 11 . However, during the 1850s and 1860$, the most aggressive and most likely competitors -Germany and the United States -experienced internal problems of unification which hindered and reduced their ability to sustain more active competition for several decades. France also confronted European and internal problems. Otherwise, Britain's role in Costa Rica probably would have faced a challenge much earlier. Still, by the late 1870s and thereafter, a revival of keen competition for economic and strategic influence is observable.
French interests in Central America, and particularly in the canal, were keenest during the early period. Louis Napoleon's interest goes back to the mid-1840s, and although, perhaps, before Napoleon rose to power he might have been encouraged by the British to serve their ends, once he obtained power in France, his policy in Central America and Mexico revealed his desire to recreate a major French voice in control of the transit routes and to block the aggressive United States thrust southward. While a canal route was one central feature in Napoleon's conception of a revived and strong French presence in Middle America, he did not discount the possibilities of creating either protectorates or satellites such as Emporer Maximilian of Mexico. Naturally, the maneuverings of the French and the Mexican Empire aroused the serious attention of the United States, which intended at the first moment to force this alien power to withdraw its political influence from the vital Caribbean area 12 . Growing European problems, terminating in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, apperently ended an active French program for influence in Middle America. Confronted with quietly expressed United States opposition, the French government refused to support Ferdinand de Lesseps' Panama canal company in the 1870s and 1880s.
The case for a conscious decision by Britain to withdraw its political influence from Central America about 1850 is well-known and based upon sound, convincing evidence. Britain considered the ClaytonBulwer pact of 1850 as preserving its existing colonies in Central America and, of course, permitting it to retain joint control over the ") Edward W. Richards, Louis Napoleon and Central America, in: Journal of Modern History, vol. XXXIV (June, 1962) Nearness to the Panama site and its claim to part of the alternative Nicaraguan route, gave Costa Rica some importance in the strategic considerations which accompanied the de Lesseps attempt. When de Lesseps failed, the United States then sought to tie Nicaragua to the United States with the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty (1884) which made the canal a joint United States-Nicaraguan project and bound the two together by a virtual alliance. Costa Rican attempts to learn more about the treaty were politely rejected. The United States did not consider Costa Rica's claim worth particular attention 18 .
Negotiations relating to the canal were not the only area of contact between the United States and Costa Rica. During the Civil War, the United States sought to colonize freed blades in Central America. The Chiriqui region in dispute between Colombia and Costa Rica was one of the spots proposed for such a colony. While Costa Rica's initial response had been receptive, provided the area selected was not the disputed Chiriqui region, ultimate realization that the United States meant to send out large numbers of blacks who would retain some ill-defined particular relationship to the mother country, prompted the Costa Rican government to reject the colonization projects. While U. S. promoters of these projects stressed the commercial benefits to the United States and the value of establishing U. S. settlements near the Asian transit routes, Costa Rica and other Central American governments feared the territorial ambitions of the United States 19 .
A final major factor in United States-Costa Rican relations, one that became progressively more important in the course of the 19th century, concerned the development of trade and shipping ties. American agents in Costa Rica prided themselves upon their accomplishments in stimulating trade, seeing in this progress not only economic benefit for both nations, but a promotion of the United States trade with Costa Rica grew as the product of a conscious policy as well as private economic initiative. When the Civil War broke out, this trade suffered because the goods were carried to Costa Rica and retailed by non-North American merchants. Thus it became clear that if the United States were to obtain a permanent place in Costa Rica's market, it would be necessary to do several things: overcome the suspicion and distrust of Americans residual from the Walker invasions, reduce the cost of American goods moving over the Panama Isthmus so they could be more competitive with European goods transported in sailing vessels around the Horn, take up a portion of the Costa Rican coffee crop so that exchange would be available to purchase United States products, improve the mail and communications system to better attract United States businessmen, and, finally, encourage Costa Rica to adopt liberal attitudes about religious and civil rights for foreign residents, in order to induce North American merchants and capitalists to accept the idea of residing in Costa Rica for a long period of time 21 .
Representative of the developing outlook of United States foreign officers, John Scliroeder, United States consul in San José, responded to a circular requesting all consuls to make a report on trade in their districts by outlining the actions needed to increase and enlarge United States trade. He concluded by observing that Costa Rica lacked a strong patriotic "manufacturing nobility", "whose aim and pride it is by fostering industry in its own country to drive out foreign imports". Thus Costa Rica had no defense against "our own manufacturing nobility" whose productivity had satisfied the United States market and "produced goods in abundance for export". These goods should be sold first to countries near the United States like Costa Rica 22 . In 1884-85, the United States sent a special commission into Central and South America to search out new market opportunities. Before departing the United States, the commission visited Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, San Francisco, and New Orleans to obtain information and listen to suggestions for increasing trade and commerce with Latin America. Clearly fast, regular, reliable shipping connections were needed. Equally clearly both agricultural and manufacturing interests insisted upon "the necessity of something being done by the Government to secure a market for the surplus products of this country". While visiting Costa Rica, the commission found that United States trade with Costa Rica had quadrupled in the past ten years, was still rising rapidly, and that the Costa Rican government was anxious to extend its access to the United States market and in return would offer Costa Rica as a market for United States manufactures and some agricultural products 23 . Thus, the United States government adopted policies to assure U. S. sole domination of any isthmian canal and to encourage the growth of United States commercial and maritime ties which would strengthen its total influence in strategically located Costa Rica.
Less well known than United States interests are German interest and involvement in mid-19th century Costa Rica (and Central America in general). German interest in Costa Rica was evident by the 1840s. From 1849 on, Costa Rica maintained an agent in Hamburg, while after 1854, a Hamburg consul served in Costa Rica until German unification. Even before a Hamburg agent began to function in Costa Rica, Carl Friedrich Rudolph Klee, serving as Hamburg, Bremen, Lübeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Prussian consul in Guatemala, supplied detailed information about trade opportunities throughout Central America. In fact, Klee's reports played a central role in encouraging the Prussian government in 1849-50 to decide to send an agent with ministerial rank to Central America to encourage trade and shipping activity 24 .
Prussia already considered itself a great power and the guardian of German interests. The Prussian cabinet followed with deep concern the missions and maneuverings of the British, United States, and French relative to a Central American canal in 1848-50. Soliciting and receiving detailed political, economic, and strategic information from its consul in Central America, its diplomatic agents in England and the United States, and from the Berlin colonization organizations, the Prussian government engaged in drafting and examining position papers in the early 1850s, including intriguing studies by Geheimer Finanzrat Franz Hugo Hesse 25 .
Hesse anticipated that Central America might become the vehicle by which Germany redirected world trade in a fashion heretofore unseen. Pointing out that Germany had always found trade areas occupied by other powers, he suggested that German emigration should be controlled to preserve and extend German power. The emigrants should become the future expanding market for German surplus exports. Hesse was aware that Germany was not considered a anwendetHesse's Middle America stretched from Mexico to New Granada, and despite his emphasis upon trade, he recognized the advantages to be extracted from the transit route through Middle America. Hesse added additional advantages to result from colonization in Central America: 1) the liberals would be removed from Prussia, 2) the Prussian navy would be encouraged and its growth fostered, and 3) the key spot of Tigre Island, a strategically valuable naval station on the Pacific coast side of Central America would be offered to the colonization group. Minister von Rabe, all agreed with Hesse's analysis and filed opinions supporting Hesse's conclusions, although they tended to give more emphasis to the transit and colonization aspects than to the trade. They decided to send Hesse to Central America as minister. Hesse's mission did not produce all the treaties and other advantages which he had hoped for, yet Prussia considered the mission significant enough to maintain it for almost ten years when only modest tangible results were forthcoming 27 . Germany's overpopulation in the early 19th century also encouraged Prussian action at mid-century. Wishing to foster emigration more useful to the German nation, and enticed by the rumored physical, agricultural, and strategic attractiveness of Central America, the Berliner Colonisation Gesellschaft created a committee to examine and plan a colonization project in Central America. The key argument of the colonization group was that surplus German production could be sent overseas, especially to key spots like Costa Rica with good agricultural possibilities, from where local products could be returned in payment to Germany. The colonists would initiate the market for German manufactures, which might then spread to the natives. The area in which these colonists settled, being near the two best canal routes, would permit Germany a significant voice to protect its vital interests in any future decisions regarding canals.
The spot selected for settlement was Costa Rica. In 1850 and again in 1853, groups of settlers under the leadership of Alexander von Biilow moved into Costa Rica via Nicaragua. While many apparently survived, the settlers did not form a tight colony and become the purchasers of German products as was originally planned. Despite official Prussian participation, the project withered, and in 1861 with the nullification of its concession by Costa Rica, died 28 .
Despite the failure of the Berliner Colonisation Gesellschaft, others in Germany responded to the main arguments proposed by that group. One individual was Carl von Scherer, traveler and publicist of the virtues of increasing German involvement in Central America, who emphasized the particular value of Costa Rica. He also viewed Central America in terms of its direct relations to Germany's expanding industry and the strategic value of obtaining influence in this key spot near the prospective Central American canal routes 29 He also observed the necessity for a naval and coaling station in the Caribbean to direct and extend German commercial interests in that area and discussed the problem of United States opposition to German efforts to obtain one 30 . Probably as a result of these colonization efforts, the 1864 Costa Rican census revealed that 50% of all foreigners from the United States and Europe were German. By 1883 that figure had declined to 18%. After the collapse of the organized German colonization efforts in Costa Rica, individual Germans moved regularly into Central America, While they continued to move to Costa Rica, the primary goal was Guatemala, where before the end of the 19th century Germans operated about half of the merchandising and import-export firms, and their investments in coffee plantations gave them a sizeable control over the coffee production of Guatemala 31 . German interest was also reflected in increased maritime activity and repeated efforts to establish a naval station.
Beginning in 1869, the Hamburg-American line initiated regular service to Central America, followed in the 1870s and 1880s by the North German Lloyd and Kosmos lines. This level of shipping activity reflected the intensification of long-developing German efforts to gain market and investment opportunities in Central America and to increase its share of the shipping profits. United States ministers and consuls in Central America during the late 1860s and after, often made observations regarding increased and relatively successful German commercial and maritime interest in Central America, despite the unification crisis. Throughout the last four decades of the 19th M ) A. Sartorius von Waltershausen, Deutschland und die Handelspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Berlin: Siemenroth & Trosdtel, 1898, pp. 60-63. 81 ) Chester Jones, Costa Rican and the Caribbean Civilization, Madison 1935, p. 36; Guillermo Nañez Falcó n, German Contributions to the Economic Development of the Alta Vera Paz of Guatemala, 1865 -1900 , M. A. thesis, Tulane University, 1961 century, the navy of the Norddeutsche Bund and later of the Reicbsrnarine eagerly sought a naval station in the Caribbean or Central America. In 1868, a German ship visited Costa Rica, examined various potential harbors and sounded and charted Puerto Limón while exploring the possibility of securing a mainland naval station. In the 1870s an incident occurred which led to a brief German naval and marine demonstrations off Nicaragua. The strong statements of German naval officers, politicians, or publicists in the 1880s and 1890s regarding the German need for a naval station and critical of the United States' activity in blocking the same, are not to be understood as indicative that the problem only existed at that point, but rather that a long standing antagonistic and competitive situation came to a head at that time 32 . While elements of this continual role might have been recognized by previous historians, certainly, nothing like a reasonable evaluation of German influence in Central America in the mid-19th century is found in the works of synthesis and analysis.
Not unexpectedly, the United States closely watched German efforts to obtain a naval base in Costa Rica, in Panama, or elsewhere in the Caribbean, taking the trouble to inform these countries that such an action would violate the Monroe Doctrine. The defense of the transit route was of utmost significance in American consideration. Thus the German efforts to acquire a naval station near the entrance, and its threatened intervention in Nicaragua, attracted serious, concerned United States attention. Even German commercial and maritime activity in Costa Rica and Middle America aroused concern. Most interestingly, given the alleged domination of Costa Rica by British interests, the United States seemed much less concerned with a stagnant British presence than with the rising, aggressive, and, apparently successful German competition for investment, trade, shipping, and naval bases 83 . The pressure upon Costa Rica was not the product of British domination of the Costa Rican export-orientated economy, but rather a response to the competition among the informal empire buildersBritain, the United States, Germany, and the other European powers. The rapidly increasing material productivity of the industrializing powers further aggravated the condition by continually enveloping vast new areas into the raw material producing sector, thus materially reducing the world price for agricultural goods, including coffee. Extra pressure was constantly being placed upon the Costa Rican elite to increase production to service their debt and maintain a steady if not increasing living standard. The mid-and late 19th century in Costa Rica witnessed the rise of an export-orientated agriculture, first with coffee, then with both coffee and bananas. The transformation of the domestic economy to fit the coffee-export market produced a dislocated domestic economy, resulting in Costa Rica's increasing dependence upon the importation of foodstuffs during the late 19th century, but also increasingly upon foreign markets, capital, and goods to retain and expand its material "progress". As the 19th century progressed, given its swelling incorporation in the trade and maritime competition of the great powers, Costa Rica managed with increasing difficulty to be master of its own fate. 
